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There is a longstanding debate in the economics literature on whether fiscally 
decentralized countries are inherently more fiscally unstable. The Great Recession 
provides a fertile testing ground for analyzing how the degree of decentralization does 
actually affect countries’ ability to implement fiscal stabilization policies in response to 
macroeconomic shocks. We provide an empirical analysis aiming at disentangling the 
roles played by decentralization design itself and several recently introduced budgetary 
institutions such as subnational borrowing rules and fiscal responsibility laws on 
country’s fiscal stability. We use OECD countries’ data since 1995, which includes both 
a boom period of worldwide economic growth and the Great Recession. Our main finding 
is that well-designed decentralized systems are not destabilizing. But, in addition, sub-
national fiscal and borrowing rules should be at work to improve the overall fiscal 
stability performance of decentralized countries.  
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There is a longstanding debate in the fiscal federalism literature on whether 
fiscally decentralized countries are inherently more fiscally unstable. For many 
years, the orthodoxy received from Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) established 
that stabilization policy should be an exclusive responsibility of central/federal 
governments went unchallenged. Even though this dictum did not directly speak to 
the possible impact of fiscal decentralization on macro stability, indirectly it was 
taken to mean that fiscally decentralized systems could weaken the ability of central 
authorities to maintain macro stability. Indeed, decentralized systems can be more 
sensitive to the problems of soft budget constraints, borrowing abuses and bailouts, 
as well as deeper challenges including the common pool problem and moral hazard 
(Pisauro, 2001). The ability to implement countercyclical fiscal policies may be 
further impeded by the lack of sub-national tax autonomy with the presence of large 
vertical fiscal imbalances. This consensus impregnated the policy advice of 
international institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank as explicitly stated by 
several influential contributions (Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1996, 2006). Thus, 
even though fiscal decentralization could be desirable for other reasons – mainly 
increasing the efficiency of public expenditures - designers and policy makers were 
seen as facing a tradeoff.  
However, those early fears about the dangers of fiscal decentralization were 
actually not backed by robust empirical evidence (Baskaran, 2010; Neyapti, 2010, 
2013; Bartolini et al., 2017). Indeed, overall fiscal management may be enhanced by 
the use of fiscal rules regarding deficits and borrowing and other recent budgetary 
innovations.  Thus, the counterview is that well-designed decentralization systems 
and budgetary institutions can actually contribute to the fiscal stability of a country. 
The Great Recession provides a fertile testing ground for analyzing how in fact 
the degree of decentralization and its design do actually affect countries’ capacity to 
implement fiscal stabilization policies in response to exogenous macroeconomic 
shocks. In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis aiming at disentangling the 
roles played by decentralization design itself and several recently introduced 
budgetary institutions such as subnational borrowing rules and fiscal responsibility 
laws on country’s fiscal stability. We use OECD countries’ data since 1995, which 
includes both a boom period of worldwide economic growth and the Great 
recession. Our main finding is that “well-designed” decentralized systems are 
stabilizing. In particular, sub-national fiscal and borrowing rules should be at work 
to improve overall fiscal stability.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the 
relevant literatures on decentralization and macroeconomic stability. Section 3 
provides a first look at the data including references to the experiences of specific 
countries. In section 4, we use cross-section time-series analysis to disentangle the 
impact of different decentralized fiscal institutions. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Related literature  
 
The orthodoxy of exclusively allocating macro-stability functions to the central 
government (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972) has been challenged over the years. Indeed, 
a longlist of studies have argued in different ways that devolving some functions for 
macroeconomic policy to sub-national governments could actually promote stability 
(e.g., Shah, 1994, 1999; Sheikh and Winer, 1977; Gramlich, 1987, 1993; McLure, 1995; 
Huther and Shah, 1996; Rodden and Wibbels, 2002). More recently, empirical studies 
investigating the actual effect of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic stability 
using cross-country data typically found either no effect or a positive beneficial effect of 
the former on the latter (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2006; Schaltegger and Feld, 
2009; Baskaran, 2010; Neyapti, 2010). On a theoretical ground, Shah (2006) provides a 
rationale for why fiscally decentralized systems may lead in practice to greater 
macroeconomic stability. According to him, fiscally decentralized systems typically 
internalize the challenges for macroeconomic control and introduce institutions that can 
address the negative incentives brought by the common pool problem, moral hazard and 
rent seeking behaviors. 
However, overall, the fears that decentralized systems can be destabilizing have 
not gone away. One can find country experiences where sub-national governments would 
appear to disregard budget constraints aggravating macroeconomic instability (Rodden, 
2002 and Rodden, Eskeland and Litvack, 2003), and many others where effective soft-
budget constraints are a reality (Stein, 1999). Some empirical evidence gives support to 
those fears. For example, Fornasari, Webb and Zou (2000) find almost a perfect 
correspondence between increases in subnational deficits and central government 
expenditures and deficits in the subsequent period.  
As part of the recognition that the actual design of fiscal decentralization matters 
for its impact on macroeconomic stability, there is also a literature that has explored the 
consequences of the lack of tax autonomy (or its other manifestation, the existence of 
large vertical fiscal imbalances) on weakening fiscal discipline by subnational 
governments. This diminished discipline takes place because of the common pool 
problem —the perception of lower costs of spending for subnational governments 
because others are footing the bill— and moral hazard and the soft budget constraint —
the perception that the upper level government sourcing the transfers will also bail out the 
subnational government in case of need.   
There are at least three avenues for the deterioration of subnational fiscal 
discipline: by increasing spending, by reducing tax collections or by increasing deficits 
and borrowing. Many studies have focused on how lack of tax autonomy leads 
subnational governments to spend more freely enlarging the size of their budgets (the 
Leviathan hypothesis) that a high vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) level undermines fiscal 
discipline by motivating local governments to further expand their expenditures (e.g., 
Stein, 1999; Jin and Zou, 2002; Rodden, 2003). Fewer studies have looked at the impact 
on lower tax effort (e.g., Jin et al., 2017). Several other authors have found evidence that 
lower tax autonomy also can lead to fiscal deficits (e.g., de Mello, 2000; Rodden, 2002; 
Eyraud and Lusinyan, 2013; Asartyan et al., 2015). 
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In more recent times, many countries with decentralized systems have buttressed 
their ability to pursue macro stability by introducing three types of interrelated fiscal 
institutions: fiscal rules regulating the borrowing behavior of subnational governments, 
fiscal responsibility laws, and independent fiscal councils monitoring deficits and 
borrowing at all levels of government. It is hard to tell whether these new institutions 
reflect the greater ability of decentralized systems to internalize the challenges of 
macroeconomic control as emphasized by Shah (2006), or whether they represent ex-post 
a recognition of sorts of the dangers posed by decentralized systems to macro stability if 
they are allowed run unchecked.  
Regarding borrowing rules, Ter-Minassian (2007, 2015) has pioneered their 
systematic study but only a few empirical studies have examined the effectiveness of 
subnational borrowing regulations (Jin and Zou, 2002; Rodden, 2002; Martinez-Vazquez 
and Vulovic, 2017). To date there is no robust evidence on the effectiveness of the 
different institutional arrangement for subnational borrowing in delivering fiscal 
discipline and macroeconomic stability. As argued by Rodriguez-Pose and Gil (2005), 
the gap between fiscal freedoms and responsibilities can cause agency problems leading 
to financial disarray, especially when there are not strict regulations for local government 
borrowing. One exception for advanced economies is provided by Foremny (2014) who 
shows that fiscal rules at the local level could be effective for decreasing public deficits 
in European countries (observed over the period 1995-2008) but only in unitary states. 
The evidence on the effectiveness of adopting of Fiscal Responsibility Laws (FRLs) is 
also mixed in developing countries. Cáceres et al. (2010) using a sample of Latin America 
and advanced countries find a positive but limited effect of FRLs on fiscal outcomes. This 
is similar to the positive effect on primary balances that de Mello (2005) had found for 
the specific case of the Fiscal Responsibility Laws in Brazil. On the other hand, Thornton 
(2009) analyzed the impact of FRLs on fiscal discipline in nine emerging market 
economies and found no significant effect. In a nutshell, the effectiveness of fiscal and 
borrowing rules depends crucially on the constitutional structure of vertical governance 
and on how decentralisation is designed and carried out. Poor design and practice may 
make fiscal and borrowing rules actually contributors to fiscal instability.  
In recent years, fiscal councils have been established as (variably) independent 
fiscal authorities to monitor and control fiscal sustainability with a strong foothold in EU 
countries. Their focus from the start has been on fiscal discipline of central governments 
and much less so of subnational governments, although the latter has been increasingly 
occupying these institutions where they have been created. Fiscal councils sprang from 
the argument that an independent authority should control government debt and deficits, 
with a mandate similar to that of central bank authorities regarding monetary policy (von 
Hagen and Harden, 1995). They have been rationalized as an instrument to address the 
time inconsistency in fiscal policies between short-run macroeconomic policy 
imperatives and the commitment to long-run fiscal performance and sustainability 
(Calmfors, 2003; Wyplosz, 2005).  
One important drawback of fiscal councils is that governments do not generally 
like to be criticized by another governmental organization, no matter how independent 
they may be. That helps explain the recent backlash against Hungary’s Fiscal Council. 
Two fairly recent reviews about performance and scope of fiscal councils (Calmfors and 
Wren-Lewis, 2011; Debrun et al., 2009) give them mixed reviews. Although the perform 
ex-ante and ex-post policy assessments and fiscal sustainability analysis, they have been 
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less effective to influence deficits and debt levels. Nevertheless, the “watchdog” role of 
fiscal councils can contribute to more sustainable fiscal policies at the national and may 
make borrowing rules and fiscal responsibility laws more effective at the subnational 
level. 
Because of the fiscal pains and tribulations associated with the Great Recession, 
scholars have looked into the role and effectiveness of fiscal institutions in helping 
address the external macroeconomic shock. In this perspective, a recent paper by Bartolini 
et al. (2017) contributes to this literature by looking at the impact of fiscal decentralization 
on aggregate, central and local budget balances in the presence of financial shocks, such 
as banking crises. The main results for a sample of 19 OECD countries over the period 
1980-2010 show that during banking crises expenditure decentralization seems to be 
beneficial for country’s fiscal discipline. However, such improvement in both aggregate 
and central fiscal budgets during financial distress is basically obtained at the expenses 
of the sub-national sector through cuts in intergovernmental transfers in order to financing 
national public policies necessary to tackle the crisis. This sounds like a familiar theme 
to what recently happened to sub-national governments in many advanced economies 
when consolidation programs and fiscal adjustment measures have been implemented to 
restore national public finances after the financial crisis and during the ongoing economic 
downturn (see, for instance, Emmerson and Tetlow, 2015 for UK; Foremny et al., 2017 
for OECD countries).  
Actually, different fiscal policy strategies were recommended by international 
organizations at the beginning of the crisis (e.g., Spilimbergo et al., 2008) with the goal 
of making sure that existing public spending programs were not cut for lack of resources. 
In particular, for sub-national entities this kind of situation could be mitigated through 
transfers from the central government, without having to suspend sub-national 
fiscal/borrowing rules (especially given the difficulty of credibly reversing the suspension 
later on). In reality, even though central governments could have had several policy 
options to face the financial crisis (e.g., implementing fiscal stimuli; engaging in reforms 
to accelerating growth) as recently re-stated by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2017), it 
seems that many central governments preferred to work mostly on an intense re-
centralization process – especially on the  spending side of the budget.  These processes 
are documented by recent studies collected by the IEB (2013) for some advanced troubled 
economies (among others, Italy and Spain).  
More generally, about the role played by the institutions of fiscal federalism in the 
outcomes from the Great Recession, it would appear that sub-national governments would 
be “too small to matter” from a general government point of view, as recently argued by 
Eyraud and Badia (2013). However, this could be true only at first glance, as the authors 
provide evidence that sub-national governments did not fully adjust expenditure in 
response to negative revenue shocks, contributing to deteriorate the overall fiscal position 
of the general government. In fact, during the recent economic crisis local governments 
in most European countries increased fiscal deficits in order to offset revenue shortfalls 
(and also probably reflecting the political difficulties of reversing past expenditure 
increases). Consequently, expenditure decentralization may have created incentives to 
overspend in many of these countries. Thus, an important question from the review of the 
recent literature, and which we put to the test in this paper, is whether decentralized 
institutional arrangements have been effective or improvements will be required to 
improve fiscal stability in OECD countries. 
6 International Center for Public Policy 
 
 
3. A first look at data  
 
 The first step of our analysis on the relationship between fiscal stability, the Great 
recession and decentralization is to review the relationship between budget balance and 
the business cycle. We rely upon a wide sample including the OECD countries over the 
period 1995-2015. Our interest is to establish if fiscal reactions to the economic cycle are 
standardized or whether there is heterogeneity across countries. The business cycle is 
proxied by the output gap estimated by the OECD,1 and the general government primary 
budget balance measures fiscal stability over GDP (NLGXQ), also included in the OECD 
database.  
Figure 1 reports individual scatters for the 32 OECD members, the OECD average 
and the UE15 average. In all cases, both the linear regression fit and non-linear nearest 
neighbor fit are represented.2 In Table 1 we report the corresponding coefficients and R-
squared from the regression for each country, where the output gap enters the right-hand 
side of the equation. In Table 1, countries are ordered according to the values of the 
estimated coefficients.  
 A first lesson to extract from both the figure and the table is that, on average, the 
relationship between primary balance and output gap is positive and statistically 
significant. The common coefficient for the average of OECD countries is close to unity 
(0.91) with a moderate R2 (0.44). The coefficient drops for the EU-15 (0.55) but the model 
still works (R2 = 0.37).  
However, both individual coefficients and goodness of fit are substantially 
different across countries. In some cases, the sensitivity is very strong (Denmark, Spain, 
the US) but it is close to zero in Poland, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Portugal, and 
Greece. Moreover, in Hungary the relationship becomes negative. While the goodness of 
fit tends to increase with the magnitude of the coefficient, there is also some diversity. 
Belgium and The Netherlands are good examples. Finally, linear and non-linear fits are 
very different in some cases, supporting the idea of heterogeneity in fiscal reactions to 











                                                          
1 In general, the observed deficit is explained by current GDP growth rates, but also on the lagged deficit 
and then on economic growth in previous years. The output gap includes information on both the current 
and past GDP growth rates. 
2 The “nearest neighbor fit” displays local polynomial regressions for two series with bandwidth based on 
nearest neighbors. Briefly, for each data point in a sample, we fit a locally weighted polynomial regression. 
It is a local regression since we use only the subset of observations which lie in a neighborhood of the point 
to fit the regression model; it may be weighted so that observations further from the given data point are 
given less weight. 
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A second step is to combine these previous results to detect the potential 
existence of well-defined clusters of countries and if the corresponding groups could be 
explained by differences in decentralization. In other words, we try to answer the 
following question: Do recessions involve a stronger or weaker effect on deficit when 
decentralization is higher?  
In particular, we look for clusters combining the coefficients and R2-adjustment 
(to measure the stability of the relationship) reported in table 1. Our analysis relies upon 
the Average Linkage Clustering method, using the Euclidean distance as the similarity or 
dissimilarity measure. The corresponding dendrogram is shown in Figure 2. Then in 
Figure 3 we also add a third variable: the extent to which a regional government co–
determines sub-national and national borrowing constraints (source: Hooghe et al., 
2016).3 Country codes are those reported in Table 1.4  
When looking for correlations between clusters and the extent of decentralization 
in Figure 2, we realize that a significant number of federal and highly decentralized 
countries according to the RAI5 are in the first cluster: Australia (1), Belgium (3), Canada 
(4) Spain (28), and the US (32). However, this group also includes countries with low 
values of the RAI: Ireland (14), UK (31), and Sweden (29). Moreover, other federal or 
quasi-federal countries such as Austria (2), Germany (10), Switzerland (30), and Italy 
(16) are in different clusters.  Hence, how decentralization would shape the relationship 
between fiscal stability and the output gap is far from evident. This conclusion remains 
when the variable measuring decisions on regional borrowing constraints is included in 
the cluster analysis. Figure 3 shows a group of countries including Australia (1), Spain 
(28), Austria (2), Belgium (3), and Germany (10). However, Canada (4) and the US (32) 
remain close to Ireland (14), the UK (31), and Sweden (29); and far away from the first 










                                                          
3 This variable (namely n_borrowout) is included in the Regional Authority Index (RAI) and it is coded in 
the following way: 
0: regional governments are not routinely consulted over borrowing constraints  
1: regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints but do not have a veto  
2: regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints 
4 All computations are performed using Stata 15. 
5 The nine OECD countries with average RAI values over 20 during the period 1995-2010 are Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the US. 
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Figure 2: Dendrogram for the cluster analysis 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations 
 
 
Figure 3: Dendrogram for the cluster analysis including decisions on regional borrowing 
constraints 
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In short, the relationship between decentralization and fiscal stability is more 
complex than a simple negative or positive significant bivariate one. One key variable 
appears to be the degree of central control over public spending, which depending on 
government priorities in each country for specific programs allowed for different degrees 
of spending cuts in response to the Great Recession (see Bozio et al., 2015). For example, 
local governments in the United Kingdom faced significant spending cuts on their 
services imposed by the central government; regions in Spain were constrained by 
strengthened national fiscal rules (since 2012), which also led to significant cuts in their 
spending (mainly on education and health services). In some cases, like France, the 
financial crisis offered the chance to introduce structural reforms, also involving the 
intergovernmental finance architecture.  
Given the large diversity of responses, we can gain additional insight by looking 
deeper into some particular country experiences. Specifically, we focus on two 
representative federal and fiscally decentralized countries, Spain and Germany, which 
were differently affected by the Great Recession and ended providing quite different 
policy responses. In addition, we consider the United Kingdom, which is a federal but 
more fiscally centralized country than the previous ones. In the same fashion, we look at 
the cases of Italy, Ireland and France as relatively fiscally centralized and unitary states, 
which suffered differently from the crisis so implementing quite different policy 
responses to face it.   
In Spain there was an attempt to tightening legislation on budgetary stability in 
2011.6 However, it appeared to have been insufficient by itself (Lago-Peñas, 2015) as this 
new and hard legal framework was not enough to guarantee the meeting of fiscal targets 
by regions, also revealing its limitations from a political economy standpoint. Moreover, 
the several financial instruments implemented by the central government since 2012 to 
bridge regional deficits (including deficits over the corresponding target) in a scenario of 
closed financial markets has been, in fact, an incentive to fiscal slippage. Another 
example of the central government’s intervention as an ex-post response to the crisis in 
Spain was the creation of an independent national fiscal agency in 2014.Given the timing, 
its impact on fiscal policy is necessarily scarcely significant up to 2015.7 
In Italy, the fiscal adjustment programs aimed at reducing public deficit and debt 
necessarily involved sub-national governments as regions and municipalities control a 
large part of public expenditure and collect sizable autonomous and shared tax revenues 
(Bordignon, 2013). This also implied cuts in grants by the central government toward 
both local entities and regions, damaging more the former than the latter.8 However, the 
recently abolished taxes at the local level (e.g., the municipal taxation on resident housing 
                                                          
6 The reform of Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution in September 2011 kicked off a profound revision 
of the legislation on budgetary stability, which was implemented by Organic Law 2/2012 of April 27 th, 
2012, on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability (LOEPSF). 
7 However, the general evaluation on this new institution has been mostly positive among experts and 
policymakers given the general consensus on the independence and technical capacity of the institution and 
its real contribution to the public debate on fiscal stability issues in Spain. 
8 This is mostly due to the different protection offered by the national legislation. Indeed, the functions of 
regions are stated in the constitution, while it is the central government who determines functions and 
financing for municipalities and provinces. 
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wealth) were re-introduced.9 At the same time, an important measure directly affecting 
regional governments was the linear cuts to the budgets of the regional health authorities 
imposed by the central government, and which emerged clearly after 2012.  
Likewise, in Spain regions faced difficulties to use revenues to achieve fiscal 
targets and they have suffered prediction mistakes of central government on in-advance 
payments. More importantly, fiscal strategies were not homogeneous across regions as 
some regional governments have been more committed to fiscal targets than others (Lago-
Peñas, Fernández-Leiceaga and Vaquero, 2017).  
In Ireland, a country that experienced the most dramatic impact of the financial 
crisis (Keane 2015) and the most relevant deterioration in public finances, important 
decentralization measures were introduced ex novo in the middle of the crisis (i.e. the flat-
rate household charge followed by residential property taxes). To alleviate the effects of 
the economic crisis on national accounts, there was also a shift from central grants to local 
own-source revenues (Turley and McNena, 2016).10  
A similar story can be told for Germany. Indeed, the German public finances were 
hit only moderately by the crisis and, as a consequence, not fundamental tax and spending 
reforms had to be enacted (for further details, see Blömer et al., 2015). At both central 
and sub-central levels, the public sector budget was balanced when the crisis broke out;11 
this allowed enough fiscal space for the central government to let the automatic stabilizers 
work without worsening state or local fiscal positions. 
Likewise, France was modestly hit by the financial crisis, but which in fact 
presented an opportunity to introduce a number of structural reforms. Among them, there 
were changes to the structure of local governments in order to simply the administrative 
system and realize some efficiency gains. More specifically, a national law in 2014 
merged the 22 original regions into 13 new regions. However, the savings in 
administration costs were only expected to be realized in years to come (André et al., 
2015).  
In the United Kingdom, an also relatively high degree of centralization facilitated 
central government measures to implement large cuts in public service spending during 
the crisis (Emmerson and Tetlow, 2015). In addition, a newly created independent 
institution-- the Office for Budget Responsibility-- was engaged to guarantee better post-
crisis official fiscal and economic forecasts, in line with the general trend experienced in 
other European countries. Indeed, also in France and other countries the most relevant 
signal to consolidating public finances after the crisis was the application of fiscal rules 
                                                          
9 Indeed, among the most important consolidation measures implemented in 2012 affecting the sub-national 
sector, there were revenue increases coming from the municipal property tax IMU and the Domestic 
Stability Pact governing local government spending (see Denk, 2013 for further details). 
10 Specifically, in 2014 the Local Government Reform Act reformed the intergovernmental fiscal relations 
by fostering local authority expenditures and income generation, so leading to lower vertical fiscal 
imbalance, and greater local autonomy. Some differences persist across councils with respect to 
dependency on central government versus self-reliance on local revenue sources, giving rise to horizontal 
fiscal imbalances. 
11 Indeed, in years before the crisis Germany implemented a series of measures to improve the structural 
position of its public finances (due subject to an excessive deficit procedure by the European Commission 
in 2002) which culminated in 2007 with a balanced budget, which was expected to be maintained in the 
medium term. 
Fiscal stability during the Great Recession: Putting decentralization design to the test  13 
 
 
(Luechinger and Schaltegger, 2013), also inspired by the Swiss debt brake in 2003 
(Danninger, 2002), and sometimes extended to all levels of government (e.g., Germany). 
 
 
4.  A Time-Series Cross-Section (TSCS) analysis  
To this point, we have seen that within our sample of countries for the last two 
decades the relationship between the macroeconomic cycle and fiscal balance is not 
uniform but rather quite heterogeneous. We have also seen that it is not possible to cluster 
the different responses across countries by their degree of decentralization. Indeed, a 
deeper look into some of the countries reveals a variety of factors and behavioral 
responses that shed considerable light into the primary heterogeneity observed in the 
responses. In this section, we advance our exploration of the relationship between fiscal 
stability, decentralization and fiscal rules using cross-section data for the OECD countries 
over the period 1995-2014 (with some gaps), taking advantage of previous studies which 
analyze the determinant of governments’ fiscal performance and budget balances (e.g., 
Bohn, 1998; Eyraud and Lusinyan, 2013; Presbitero et al., 2014; Mauro et al., 2015).  
Our aim is to test two basic hypotheses on the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
macroeconomic stability. First, that fiscal decentralization design, in particular, providing 
subnational government with fiscal autonomy leads to improved stabilization outcomes 
via increased fiscal indiscipline. Second, the added presence of borrowing and fiscal rules 
further and independently works to enhance stability.  
 
4.1 Specification  
 The general econometric specification is the following: 
 
𝑁𝐿𝐺𝑋𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜌𝑁𝐿𝐺𝑋𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑉_𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
+𝜓𝑚 ∑ 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚 +𝛾𝑗 ∑ 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑗𝑖𝑡 +𝑗 𝛿𝑘 ∑ 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑡 +𝑘 𝑖𝑡    [1] 
As in the previous section, NLGXQ stands for general government primary balance (as a 
percentage of GDP). We use primary balance to proxy country’ fiscal stability as this 
indicator represents a more direct measure of the budgetary policy in the hands of 
governments, not including the cost for servicing the debt. The variable GDPV_ANNPCT 
is the GDP growth rate at constant prices computed by the OECD.12 Vector POL includes 
two political variables: the electoral cycle and the ideology of the incumbent. The former 
is a dummy equal to 1 if there was a legislative election in that year; the latter refers to 
the chief executive party orientation. Specifically, we create a dummy equal to 1 if the 
incumbent government is leftist and 0 otherwise. Vector DEC comprises several fiscal 
decentralization indicators. In particular, we use measures of expenditure decentralization 
computed by the OECD, and tax autonomy and borrowing autonomy belonging to the 
Regional Authority Index (RAI) by Hooghe et al. (2016).  
Finally, vector RULES embodies three dummy variables - capturing the existence 
of fiscal rules concerning budget balance at supranational, national, and subnational 
                                                          
12 Since the lagged endogenous is included among regressors, we rely upon GDP growth rates rather than 
the output gap as in the bivariate relationships in previous section. Note that the lagged endogenous variable 
already captures the effect of the past GDP growth rates on the deficit. 
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levels - and a fiscal rule index taking into account a more comprehensive approach based 
on the effectiveness and strength of the rules. More concretely, the first two dummies are 
based on the IMF database which exploits country-specific information at the national 
and supranational levels. The subnational fiscal rule dummy is built by taking advantage 
of the European Commission database, which provides detailed information for this lower 
level of government over time; official country reports are used to build the same dummy 
for non-EU members in our sample. In both cases, the dummy is coded 1 if there was a 
budget balance rule at the subnational level in the specific year. Finally, the composite 
fiscal rule index as computed by the EC has the advantage of taking into account different 
dimensions of fiscal rules, beyond their mere existence.13 Overall, the highest is the score, 
the strictest is the rule. There are some limitations associated with this index. First, we 
are not able to disentangle the impact of rules at different government levels as the index 
provides coverage for the entire general government finances;14 and second, the index 
covers only EU countries. 
In order to deal with idiosyncratic time-invariant factors, a set of individual fixed 
effects is included. Second, period fixed effects are also incorporated to capture common 
shocks. Finally, the lagged endogenous is added to the right-hand of the equation to deal 
with dynamics. Table 2 reports acronyms, definitions and data sources of all those 
variables. Due to potential multicollinearity issues (as indicated by correlations in Table 
3), we discard the concurrent inclusion of all variables and use different combinations of 
factors belonging to both vectors (especially in the case of DEC and RULES vectors).  
 
Table 2: Variables, definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition Data source 
NLGXQ 








ELECTIONS Dummy variable. It is coded 1 in legislative election years 





LEFT Dummy variable. It is coded 1 if the incumbent is leftist and 
0 otherwise 
WB - Database 
of Political 
Institutions 
                                                          
13 For instance, these issues are considered: the legal base of the rule; the room for revising objectives; the 
mechanisms of monitoring compliance and enforcement of the rule; the media visibility of the rule. 
Ultimately, these scores are aggregated into the composite index following the methodology proposed by 
Deroose et al. (2006). 
14 A scheme of different weights is used when more rules apply to the same general government sub-sector. 
This weighting is adopted to reflect decreasing marginal benefit of multiple rules applying to the same sub-
sector of general government. 
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EXPENDEC Share of consolidated sub-national expenditure over general 





FISCALAUTO The extent to which a regional government can independently 
tax its population: 0: central government sets base and rate of 
all regional taxes. 1: regional government sets the rate of 
minor taxes 2: regional government sets base and rate of 
minor taxes 3: regional government sets the rate of at least 
one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or 
sales tax 4: regional government sets base and rate of at least 
one major tax. 
Hooghe et al. 
(2016)  
 
BORROWAUTO The extent to which a regional government can borrow: 0: the 
regional government does not borrow (e.g. centrally imposed 
rules prohibit borrowing) 1: the regional government may 
borrow under prior authorization (ex ante) by the central 
government and with one or more of the following centrally 
imposed restrictions: a. golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to 
cover current account deficits) b. no foreign borrowing or 
borrowing from the central bank c. no borrowing above a 
ceiling d. borrowing is limited to specific purposes 2: the 
regional government may borrow without prior authorization 
(ex post) and under one or more of a), b), c), 3: the regional 
government may borrow without centrally imposed 
restrictions. 
Hooghe et al. 
(2016) 
 
BORROWCON The extent to which a regional government co–determines 
subnational and national borrowing constraints: 0: regional 
governments are not routinely consulted over borrowing 
constraints 1: regional governments negotiate routinely over 
borrowing constraints but do not have a veto 2: regional 
governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints 
Hooghe et al. 
(2016)  
BBRSUPRA Dummy variable coded 1 if a Supranational Budget Balance 
Rule (BBR) applies and 0 otherwise 
IMF (Fiscal 
Rules Dataset)  
BBRNATIONAL Dummy variable coded 1 if a National Budget Balance Rule 
(BBR) applies and 0 otherwise 
IMF (Fiscal 
Rules Dataset)  
BBRSUBNATIONAL Dummy variable coded 1 if a Subnational Budget Balance 









FRINDEX Fiscal Rules Index. Data is only available for EU countries. 
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Table 3: Simple correlation. Stacked sample. Pairwise samples. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1)NLGXQ 1            
(2)GDPV_ANNPCT 0.15 1           
(3)ELECTIONS -0.06 0.03 1          
(4)LEFT 0.03 0.02 -0.01 1         
(5)EXPENDEC 0.24 -0.05 0.03 0.06 1        
(6)FISCALAUTO 0.23 -0.19 0.04 0.05 0.70 1       
(7)BORROWAUTO 0.13 -0.20 0.02 0.17 0.50 0.79 1      
(8)BORROWCON 0.06 -0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.17 0.30 0.25 1     
(9)BBRSUPRA -0.05 -0.13 -0.04 -0.05 -0.17 -0.11 -0.02 0.12 1    
(10)BBRNATIONAL 0.18 -0.07 0.01 -0.03 0.30 0.14 0.06 0.25 -0.11 1   
(11)BBRSUBNATIONAL 0.12 -0.13 0.02 -0.16 0.19 0.40 0.40 0.09 -0.47 0.11 1  
(12)FRINDEX 0.08 -0.09 0.05 -0.16 0.35 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.20 0.51 0.05 1 




Table 4 reports basic descriptive statistics. Given the unbalanced panel nature of 
our database - mostly due to missing information15 -, we choose to report results only for 
the common balanced sample (317 observations). In any case, depending on the variables 
included in the different regression specifications, the number of valid observations 


















                                                          
15 In particular, variables from the RAI database are available up to 2010, political variables until 2012 and 
FRINDEX only for the EU countries.  




Table 4: Summary statistics. Individual samples. 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum  Standard deviation Observations 
NLGXQ -0.20 -0.04 15.8 -29.8  3.89 643 
GDPV_ANNPCT 2.54 2.62 11.9 -14.4  3.03 674 
ELECTIONS 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.00  0.45 576 
LEFT 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.00  0.47 680 
EXPENDEC 30.8 29.9 69.2 4.86  14.9 550 
FISCALAUTO 1.59 1.00 5.07 0.00  1.66 512 
BORROWAUTO 1.43 1.04 4.00 0.00  1.26 512 
BORROWCON 0.23 0.00 2.00 0.00  0.57 512 
BBRSUPRA 0.61 1.00 1.00 0.00  0.49 620 
BBRNATIONAL 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.00  0.49 620 
BBRSUBNATIONAL 0.62 1.00 1.00 0.00  0.49 304 
FRINDEX 0.36 0.24 3.14 -1.01  0.96 420 
 
4.2 Econometric issues  
The preliminary estimates confirm that period effects were highly significant. The 
lagged dependent variable is also very significant in most cases. While autocorrelation 
fades once period fixed effects and lagged dependent variable are included, 
contemporaneous correlation in residuals do not. Hence, we choose to replace standard 
OLS errors by Panel Corrected standard errors, robust to both cross correlation and cross-
section heteroscedasticity (Beck and Katz, 1995). Concerning the individual fixed effects, 
the corresponding F-tests show their relevance. Moreover, a Hausman test revealed that 
the fixed-effect option is preferred. The potential endogeneity of the variable 
GDPV_ANNPCT - due to the demand effects of fiscal policy -, is discussed below.  
As it is known, autoregressive models with fixed effects lead to biased parameter 
estimates (Nickell, 1981). However, this bias is of O(1/T). Hence, if T is 2 or 3, the bias 
is severe, but it becomes small when T is 20 or more, as in our case (Beck and Katz, 
2011). Moreover, according to Monte Carlo evidence obtained in previous works by both 
authors, the usual corrections for this bias (Anderson-Hsiao and Kiviet estimators) does 
not perform better than the Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) for the T’s seen 
typically in TSCS analysis (20 or more). Furthermore, on the negative side of those 
alternatives, most often it is hard to find good instruments (Anderson-Hsiao), or it 
becomes hard to combine with other methods to deal with problems such as 
contemporaneous correlation (Kiviet). Hence, Beck and Katz (2011) do not hesitate to 
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recommend OLS when country-specific intercepts must be adjoined to the specification 
of a TSCS model (Beck and Katz, 2011).16  
In sum, in Table 5 we use the LSDV estimator but additionally we check the 
robustness of the results using several alternatives for estimation in Table 6. In particular, 
in column (2b) we replicate column (2) in Table (5) but we drop the individual fixed 
effects. As expected, the R2 value is lower than in Table 5 but the difference is not 
dramatic and the results regarding the estimated coefficients and their statistical 
significance hold.17 Finally, in column (2c) the variable GDPV_ANNPCT is dropped to 
check the sensitivity of results to the potential endogeneity of this regressor. Our results 
still hold. 
 
4.3 Empirical results 
 The general picture in tables 5 and 6 delivers the same key message. First, the 
effect of the GDP growth rate is moderate and only marginally significant across 
specifications. Second, political variables are not statistically significant and then dropped 
from the model to increase the number of available common observations to perform 
econometric estimates.18  
 
 
                                                          
16 More recently, Allison et al. (2017) and Moral-Benito et al. (2017) show the poor finite properties of 
panel GMM estimators (in particular, the Arellano-Bond estimator) when N is small, as in our case. Hence, 
they propose a new maximum likelihood estimator (implemented in Stata code as xtdpdml), but they 
recognize that this estimator tends to work best when panels are strongly balanced, T is relatively small 
(e.g. less than 10), and there are no missing data. In fact, using the software STATA 15 we re-estimated 
our specification, but both computation and convergence problems arose. Hence, we choose to discard it. 
17 We use column (2) as the benchmark for the robustness analysis because the sample is maximized. 
18 The number of observations increases from 462 (1) to 518 (2) mostly because of the time span extends 
up to 2014. The lack of statistical significance of ELECTIONS hold when it was coded 1 in pre-election 
years and 0 otherwise. 
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Second, the effects of decentralization variables go in the expected direction but 
they are not particularly robust. The coefficient of EXPENDEC is generally positive and 
statistically significant.19 Hence, fiscal stability tends to improve with expenditure 
decentralization. However, tax decentralization is not statistically significant. Such 
different effect between expenditure and revenue decentralization might be due to the fact 
that, at least in advanced economies, we observe the presence of asymmetric 
decentralization based on higher values of the former compared to values of the latter 
(Blochliger and Vammalle 2012). 
While BORROWAUTO is not statistically significant, BORROWCON is negative 
and significant. Its negative sign means that the extent to which regional governments 
contribute to co–determine subnational and national borrowing constraints affects fiscal 
imbalance in a negative manner. Although collaboration and consultation among levels 
of government regarding borrowing limits may be attractive, it appears to also carry 
significant risks. 
Concerning fiscal rules, both national and supranational budget balance rules are 
positively related to fiscal stability, and the effect of the former is more robust across 
specifications. However, the dummy variable capturing the existence of budget balance 
rules at the subnational level is not statistically significant. This means that rules working 
at the subnational sector appear not to be as effective for the country’s fiscal performance. 
This result is not surprising considering the findings in the previous literature (e.g., 
Debrun et al., 2008; Eyraud et al., 2012; Bartolini et al., 2017). In this regard, Kotia and 
Lledo (2016) recently argue that to get a discipline-enhancing effect via subnational fiscal 
rules, differences in revenue and spending assignments across levels of government 
should be small, i.e. the vertical fiscal imbalances should be not large. 
Finally, the variable FRINDEX is positive and highly significant in our 
estimations: the stricter the rule, the lower the deficit. Additionally, the results in column 
(5), which are focused on the period 2008-2014, are very interesting. While the statistical 
significance of all variables substantially drops in comparison with column (4), reflecting 
the breakdown of the structural relationships due to the Great Recession, the FRINDEX 
remains highly significant. This might also suggest that, to properly disentangle the fiscal 
rules effect, a more complex and comprehensive indicator is needed to go beyond the de 
jure existence of a budget balance rule. That is, the mere existence of fiscal rules might 
not imply governments’ effective commitment leading to implement sounder fiscal 
policies. 
Summarizing, the level of decentralization does not challenge fiscal stability. On 
the contrary, we find that the level of expenditure decentralization contributes positively 
to fiscal stability. However, an active role played by subnational governments in defining 
borrowing constraints may result in less fiscal stability. Most importantly, the presence 
of fiscal rules and borrowing limits do appear to really matter, significantly contributing 
to greater fiscal stability.  
                                                          
19 The exception is column (5) where we reduce the sample to the period 2008-2014 to focus on the crisis 
period. 





6. Concluding remarks 
 
 In this paper, we revisit the question of whether fiscally decentralized countries 
are inherently more fiscally unstable by taking advantage of the strong tests that the 
macroeconomic and fiscal shocks associated with the Great Recession represent. 
Actually, we use data for OECD countries since 1995, which allows to include both a 
boom period of worldwide economic expansion as well as the Great recession. 
 There is little question that poorly designed fiscal decentralization systems can 
add to macroeconomic instability. Numerous country examples over the last several 
decades have shown that. Theoretically, decentralization systems with large vertical 
imbalances between spending responsibilities and revenue autonomy can lead to fiscal 
indiscipline in the form of low tax effort, excessive spending, and irresponsible borrowing 
behavior. An important antidote for many of these problems is to significantly increase 
the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments, thus reducing vertical fiscal imbalances 
and with it, the perverse incentives toward fiscal indiscipline. However, good design with 
fiscal autonomy may not be a sufficient condition for responsible overall fiscal behavior 
of subnational governments. There can still be powerful political economy incentives for 
subnational authorities to over borrow and overspend. Thus, subnational borrowing and 
fiscal rules may be needed in order to guarantee good results in terms of macroeconomic 
stability.       
 In our empirical analysis using the OECD data we aim first at disentangling the 
role played by decentralization design itself. Second, we analyze the potential role played 
by several relatively recent budgetary institutions, such as subnational borrowing rules 
and fiscal responsibility laws, on country’s fiscal stability. The first step of our analysis 
is to review the relationship between fiscal stability and the economic cycle. Our aim is 
to examine whether fiscal reactions (measured by the general government primary budget 
balance over GDP) to the economic cycle across countries (measured by the output gap) 
are standardized or whether there is heterogeneity. Our empirical findings support the 
idea of heterogeneity in fiscal reactions to the economic cycle. A second step in our 
analysis is to combine those heterogeneous results to detect the potential existence of 
well-defined clusters of countries and whether those clusters could be explained by 
differences in decentralization. Here we conclude that it is far from evident for how 
decentralization shapes the relationship between fiscal stability and the output gap, as 
demonstrated by the experiences of Germany, Italy, Ireland and Spain. It is not only that 
the size of the macroeconomic shock differed considerably across countries and that their 
decentralized institutions greatly differ or how they changed in response to the shock, but 
the political will by central authorities to intervene and utilize the existing fiscal 
legislation and institutions demonstrates significant variations. There is also 
heterogeneity in how subnational jurisdictions respond within each country.  
We conduct time-series cross-section (TSCS) analysis to advance our exploration 
of the relationship between fiscal stability, decentralization and fiscal rules using data for 
the OECD countries over the period 1995-2014, taking advantage of previous studies 
which analyze the determinant of governments’ fiscal performance and budget balances. 
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Our main finding is that well-designed decentralized systems are not destabilizing. In 
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